We say that a real X is n-generic relative to a perfect tree T if X is a path through T and for all Σ 0 n (T ) sets S, there exists a number k such that either X|k ∈ S or for all σ ∈ T extending X|k we have σ / ∈ S. A real X is n-generic relative to some perfect tree if there exists such a T . We first show that for every number n all but countably many reals are n-generic relative to some perfect tree. Second, we show that proving this statement requires ZFC − + "∃ infinitely many iterates of the power set of ω". Third, we prove that every finite iterate of the hyperjump, O (n) , is not 2-generic relative to any perfect tree and for every ordinal α below the least λ such that sup β<λ (βth admissible) = λ, the iterated hyperjump O (α) is not 5-generic relative to any perfect tree. Finally, we demonstrate some necessary conditions for reals to be 1-generic relative to some perfect tree.
Introduction
A real (viewed as an element of 2 ω ) is n-generic if for every Σ 0 n set there is an initial segment of the real which either meets the set or for which no extension of the segment can meet the set. These reals have many interesting characteristics and have been studied extensively (see Jockusch and Posner [3] and Kumabe [5] among others). While the set of n-generics is comeager, it is in some ways limited. In particular, it is completely excluded from the cone above 0 ′ since no 1-generic can compute an r.e. set. A question which naturally arises then is how this set might be expanded from reals which are n-generic to those that can be made to seem n-generic in some appropriate context. An attractive framework for this question is to consider reals which are n-generic when viewed as paths through a given perfect tree, rather than all of 2 ω .
Definition: A real X is n-generic relative to a perfect tree T if X is a path through T and for all Σ 0 n (T ) sets S, there is a k such that either X|k ∈ S or σ / ∈ S for every σ ∈ T extending X|k.
Definition: A real X is n-generic relative to some perfect tree if there exists a perfect tree T such that X is n-generic relative to T .
In this paper, we examine the set of reals n-generic relative to some perfect tree. We first show that the set of reals not n-generic relative to any perfect tree is countable. From this we can infer that many reals with properties that are not normally associated with genericity still seem generic in the context of some perfect tree. For example, there are reals of minimal degree and reals with high information content, such as the theory of second order arithmetic, that are generic relative to some perfect tree.
The proof that the set of reals not n-generic relative to any perfect tree is countable uses ZFC − and n iterates of the power set of ω. We show that for sufficiently large n, this requirement is sharp and cannot be significantly improved. From this we see that for reasonably high values of n, the set of reals not n-generic relative to any perfect tree is unusually large for a countable set of this type. It provides a natural example of a set which needs this level of ZFC to be understood.
The set of reals not n-generic relative to some perfect tree behaves similarly for low values of n. By looking at the iterates of the hyperjump, we demonstrate that the set still contains reals of unexpectedly high complexity. Even for n = 2, relatively large fragments of arithmetic fail to prove the set is countable. We also begin to characterize the sets that are 1-generic relative to some perfect tree.
In a similar vein, Reimann and Slaman [8] have recently studied the set of reals which appear random in some context, in this case relative to some continuous measure. Our results for genericity are analogous to what they have discovered for randomness in surprisingly many, but not all, instances.
This work formed part of the author's Ph.D. Thesis at the University of California at Berkeley. We thank Theodore Slaman, the dissertation supervisor, for his introduction to the topic and his repeated suggestions of new approaches to problems.
Co-Countably Many Reals
We wish to show that the set of reals not n-generic relative to any perfect tree is countable. D. Martin [6] used Borel determinacy to show that any property which is Borel and cofinal in the Turing degrees is represented on every degree in a cone of Turing degrees. The base of this cone is the complexity of the winning strategy for an associated game. Theorem 2.1 (Martin [6] ). Let B be a Borel set of reals such that for every Turing degree d there is an e ≥ T d and an X in e such that X ∈ B. Then there is a degree c such that for all b ≥ T c there is a Y in b such that Y ∈ B.
Proof. Consider a two person game where player I constructs a real X and player II constructs a real Y . Play alternates between the players, each adding the next digit to the real they are constructing for their turn. Player I wins iff Y ≤ T X and either X ≤ T Y or X ∈ B.
By Borel determinacy, there exists a winning strategy σ. Suppose σ is a winning strategy for II. Since B is cofinal in the Turing degrees, let Z ∈ B with σ ≤ T Z. Let I play Z and II play according to σ resulting in Y . But then since σ ≤ T Z, we have Y ≤ T Z with Z ∈ B so I wins for a contradiction. Hence σ must be a winning strategy for I.
Let Z ≥ T σ be an arbitrary real in the cone above σ. Have II play Z and I play according to σ, resulting in X. Since σ ≤ T Z we have X ≤ T Z. Since I wins, Z ≤ T X and X ∈ B. Hence for any Z in the cone, there is an X ∈ B such that X ≡ T Z.
Reimann and Slaman [8] have developed a powerful way to relativize this lemma. Let B ⊆ 2 ω × 2 ω denote a set of reals where the first real holds some property relative to the second. Let B Z = {X | (X, Z) ∈ B} and let the notation
Suppose that for every Z the set B Z is Borel in Z and cofinal in the Turing degrees as in the above method for generating a cone. They prove that for all but countably many reals X, there exist reals Y and G such that X ≡ T,G Y and Y ∈ B G . Let β be the least ordinal such that L β satisfies (enough) ZFC and let X / ∈ L β be arbitrary (L β is countable). Reimann and Slaman use Kumabe-Slaman forcing to find a real G such that
In particular, the strategy for the associated game relative to G is recursive in X ⊕ G. So by Lemma 2.1 relativized to G there exists Y ∈ B G with Y ≡ T,G X. Thus to prove all but countably many reals are n-generic relative to some perfect tree, we need to find a set B such that for any X, Y, G with Y ≡ T,G X and Y ∈ B G we have X n-generic relative to some perfect tree. B must also be Borel and such that for every Z the set B Z is cofinal in the Turing degrees. We find it suffices to let B be the set of reals of Turing degree X ⊕ A for any X, A such that X is (n + 1)-generic (A). We use the following lemma. Lemma 2.2. Let n ≥ 2, A be a set, X be n-generic (A), and X ≡ T,A Y . Then Y is (n − 1)-generic relative to some perfect tree.
Proof. Let Ψ : X → Y and Φ : Y → X be A-recursive Turing reductions that witness X ≡ T,A Y . Since X is at least 2-generic (A), let p ∈ X be such that
T is a perfect tree by our choice of p. We claim that Y is (n − 1)-generic relative to T .
Let S be an arbitrary Σ 0 n−1 (T ) set. We consider the pullback
. We now apply the genericity of X for the pullback to get the genericity of Y for S.
Since X is n-generic (A) we have two possible cases. Case 1: ∃n[X|n ∈ Ψ −1 (S)]. We then let m be such that Y |m ⊆ Ψ(X|n) and Y |m ∈ S.
Let m be such that Φ(Y |m) ⊇ X|n. We will show Y |m witnesses Y is (n − 1)-generic relative to T for S. Consider an arbitrary r ∈ T such that r ⊇ Y |m. Since r ∈ T , let q be such that Ψ(q) ⊇ r and q ⊇ p. We note q ⊇ Φ(Ψ(q)) ⊇ Φ(r) ⊇ Φ(Y |m) ⊇ X|n. Hence by the condition for this case, q / ∈ Ψ −1 (S) so r / ∈ S. Since r is arbitrary, for all r ⊇ Y |m with r ∈ T we have r / ∈ S.
We note that a similar proof can be used to show for n ≥ 1 that sets in the same truth table degree as an n-generic are n-generic relative to some perfect tree.
We can now use the approach outlined above.
Theorem 2.3. For every n ∈ ω, the set of reals not n-generic relative to some perfect tree is countable.
Proof. Fix n ∈ ω and let
Given any reals C and Z, we let H be (n + 1)-generic (C ⊕ Z) and
Z is cofinal in the Turing degrees. By the theorem of Reimann and Slaman [8] noted above, for all but countably many reals X, there exist Y and
2, X is n-generic relative to some perfect tree. Therefore, all but countably many reals are n-generic relative to some perfect tree.
ZFC − Required
If we examine the proof that the set of reals not n-generic relative to any perfect tree is countable, we see that the greatest use of the axioms of ZFC comes from the application of Borel determinacy. The proof uses determinacy of a Π 0 n+3
game on ω ω , so it requires ZFC − and the existence of n iterates of the power set of ω. We prove that for sufficiently large n this is essentially the best possible result. In particular, we prove that for any finite k the statement "For all n, the set of reals not n-generic relative to any perfect tree is countable" cannot be proved from ZFC − and k iterates of the power set of ω. This suggests the set of reals not n-generic relative to any perfect tree is a countable set of considerable size and complexity.
Theorem 3.1. For every k ∈ ω the statement "For all n, the set of reals not n-generic relative to any perfect tree is countable" cannot be proved from ZFC − +"∃k iterates of the power set of ω".
To prove this theorem we use a template developed by Reimann and Slaman [8] for reals random relative to a continuous measure. We work with the case k = 0; the general case follows the same pattern. Let λ be the least ordinal such that L λ |= ZFC − and let O be the set of limit ordinals below λ. Let M α , for α ∈ O, denote master codes. These are the elementary diagrams of canonical countings of L α . Reimann and Slaman prove the theorem by showing that for some fixed n, for every α ∈ O, the master code M α is not n-random relative to a continuous measure.
To show this, they assume towards a contradiction that some M β is nrandom relative to the measure µ. It is arithmetic to say that M is a master code for an ω-model of "V = L α and α a limit and α ≥ λ". Note such an ω-model need not be well-founded. They show it is also arithmetic to require that for all such M and N and some fixed m ∈ ω either one coded model embeds into the other or there is a Σ 0 m (M ⊕ N ) set witnessing the ill-foundedness of one of the coded models.
Reimann and Slaman define a set M, arithmetic in µ, of such psuedo-master codes which are recursive in µ and not shown to be ill-founded by such a comparison. They then define an order on M such that the well founded part of this order, I, is arithmetic in µ ⊕ M β and equals the set of M ∈ M which are actual master codes M α . Since random sets cannot accelerate the calculation of well-foundedness, I is arithmetic in µ.
Let γ ≤ β be least such that
By taking a Skolem hull of the parameters defining X, Reimann and Slaman show that M γ is arithmetic in I, hence arithmetic in µ, and M γ ≤ T M β . Since randomness cannot accelerate arithmetic definability, M γ ≤ T µ for a contradiction.
This proof uses only two facts about randomness. Namely, that it cannot accelerate arithmetic definability or calculations of well-foundedness. To complete a similar proof for genericity with the perfect tree T in place of the measure µ we need only demonstrate the corresponding facts for genericity. For n sufficiently large relative to a fixed k, m and G n-generic relative to the perfect tree T , we must show:
2. If WF is the well founded part of a linear order recursive in T and
We can routinely relativize to a perfect tree the proof that for reals A, G where G is k-generic and A is Σ Proof. By the first fact above, it suffices to show WF is Σ 0 j (T ) for some j. Let Φ be a T -recursive Turing reduction such that Φ(G) = WF . For b ∈ L let P (b) be the set of reals which code initial segments of L below b. Let R(b) ≤ T L be the tree defined below such that P (b) is the set of paths through R(b).
We define Q as the set of strings in T below which Φ does not split on T .
We will use the fact that b ∈ WF iff WF ∈ P (b). Let S = {σ | Φ(σ) ∈ R(b)}. We will determine if b ∈ WF by checking for the existence of a real which is generic for S and computes an element of P (b) using Φ. Let Θ(b) be the statement
Since G is 1-generic relative to T , there is a k such that for all τ ∈ T with τ ⊇ G|k we have τ ∈ S. Thus G|k witnesses Θ(b).
(⇐=) Let σ witness Θ(b). Then for all τ ∈ T with τ ⊇ σ we have Φ(τ ) ∈ R(b). Also, since σ ⊇ G|l, for all such τ we have τ ∈ Q so Φ splits on T below τ . Using these facts we can construct a perfect subtree of R(b) by applying Φ to T below σ. Hence P (b) is uncountable. Since there are only countably many well founded initial segments of L, b ∈ WF .
By the claim WF is Σ 0 2 (T ) as desired. Hence WF ≤ T T .
Iterated Hyperjumps
We now look at the set of reals which are n-generic relative to some perfect tree for lower values of n. We still find that the set of reals not n-generic relative to any perfect tree is a large countable set. It contains reals of high complexity and its countability cannot be proved in large fragments of second order arithmetic. We show that the finite iterates of the hyperjump, O (n) , are not 2-generic relative to any perfect tree and the iterates O (α) are not 5-generic relative to any perfect tree for any α below the least λ such that sup β<λ (βth admissible) = λ.
For simplicity, we start with the case of O. This set can be viewed as {e | U e is well-founded} where U e denotes the eth recursive tree in ω <ω . We note O then has the property that the well-foundedness of subtrees cannot contradict 6 the decision made for the parent tree. This can be characterized by a Σ 0 2 set, S, so that if O were 2-generic relative to some T then T would be able to calculate O by tracing subtrees.
Lemma 4.1. O is not 2-generic relative to any perfect tree.
Proof. Suppose not, witnessed by T . Define O = {e | U e is well-founded} as above. Let h be a recursive function defined by U h(e,γ) = {σ ∈ U e | σ ⊆ γ ∨ σ ⊇ γ}. Let
The set S contains finite strings τ which say some tree U n is ill-founded, but for some length l, there is no extension of τ in T that says some subtree of U n with root length at least l is ill-founded. In short, τ says U n is ill-founded but there is no sequence of extensions in T to witness it.
O has a sequence of subtrees witnessing the ill-foundedness of a tree, found simply by descending along any infinite path. Hence, O / ∈ S. Since S is Σ 0 2 (T ) and we have assumed O is 2-generic relative to T , we let k be such that for any σ ∈ T extending O|k we have σ / ∈ S. We can now use the fact that these extensions are sufficiently well behaved to calculate O from T .
Claim. For any number e, we have e ∈ O ⇐⇒ ¬∃σ ∈ T [σ ⊇ O|k ∧ σ(e) = 0].
Proof. (⇐=) Let σ = O| max(k, e) + 1. σ ∈ T since O is a path in T , so σ(e) = O(e) = 1. Hence e ∈ O.
(=⇒) Let e ∈ O and suppose the conclusion fails, witnessed by σ. U e is wellfounded since e ∈ O. We will construct an infinite path through U e to get the desired contradiction. We use an induction to simultaneously construct paths γ through U e and θ through T . Let j 0 denote e and j m+1 denote h(j m , γ m+1 ). We maintain inductively that θ m (j m ) = 0.
We begin with γ 0 = and θ 0 = σ and note θ 0 (j 0 )) = σ(e) = 0 by our assumption. Let γ m and θ m be given. θ m ⊇ σ ⊇ O|k so θ m / ∈ S. Hence we have
Choosing n = j m and l =length(γ m ) + 1 and noting by our induction hypothesis θ m (j m ) = 0, we get
We now let γ m+1 = α and θ m+1 = β. We note that γ m+1 ⊇ γ m since γ m+1 ∈ U h(jm−1,γm) and that θ m+1 (j m+1 ) = θ m+1 (h(j m , γ m+1 )) = 0, completing the induction.
Thus O is Π 0 1 (T ), contradicting O being 2-generic relative to T .
For the successor case, we apply the same ideas used in the above lemma to the column of O (n) which computes O.
Lemma 4.2. Let X ≥ T O be 2-generic relative to the perfect tree T . Then
Proof. Let Φ be a Turing reduction such that Φ(X) = O. We define S as before, this time for the image under Φ.
We note S is Σ 0 2 (T ) and X / ∈ S. Since X is 2-generic relative to T , we let k be such that for any σ ∈ T extending X|k we have σ / ∈ S. We now claim that for any e, we have e ∈ O if and only if there does not exist a σ ∈ T with σ ⊇ X|k and [Φ(σ)](e) = 0. This is proved in substantially the same manner as the claim in the previous lemma. As a result, O is Π 0 1 (T ). Since X is 2-generic relative to T and O ≤ T X, we get O ≤ T T as desired.
is not 2-generic relative to any perfect tree.
Proof. Fix n and suppose not, witnessed by T . We show by induction on
Corollary 4.4. The statement "All but countably many reals are 2-generic relative to some perfect tree" fails to hold in Π 
The set {O (n) | n ∈ ω} fails to be countable in this model.
To handle limit ordinals, we use a lemma in the style of Enderton and Putnam [2] . Lemma 4.5 (Slaman [11] ). Let A be a set and λ a recursive limit ordinal. Suppose that for all β < λ,
Proof. We continue to use O = {e | U e is well founded} where U e denotes the eth recursive tree in ω <ω . Since O ≤ T A we can define O from A by noting that U e is well founded iff U e has no infinite path recursive in A.
has no infinite path recursive in A)
where (X) 0 and (X) 1 denote the two columns of X.
We extend this idea to find a uniform definition for O (λ) . Fix a system of notations, o, for λ. We have
where c 0 , c 1 , c 2 , . . . is the fundamental sequence for o(c) and Γ(X, Z) is the statement ∀e[e ∈ Z ↔ U X e has no infinite path recursive in A]
If we repeat the proof with O (λ) we improve the result slightly to
Now we can complete our induction.
Theorem 4.6. Let λ be the least ordinal such that sup β<λ (βth admissible) = λ. Then for all α < λ we have O (α) is not 5-generic relative to any perfect tree.
Proof. Suppose not, witnessed by β and T . We define the function f by f (0) = ω CK 1 , f (δ + 1) = least admissible greater than f (δ), and for limit δ, f (δ) = sup ξ<δ f (ξ). We note that λ is the least fixed point of f . Using the fact that
for any δ [9] , we see by induction that f (δ) < ω
. By Lemma 4.2, α is a nonzero limit ordinal so choose γ < α such that α < f (γ). Then α < ω
so we can fix a system of notations, o, for α recursive in O (γ+1) . Since γ + 1 < α we have O (γ+1) ≤ T T . We now apply Lemma 4.5 using o and T to get that O (α) ≤ T T for a contradiction.
1-generics
In the 1-generic case, we can use a variety of approaches to identify sets of reals that are 1-generic relative to some perfect tree and sets whose members cannot have this property. A real is said to be ranked if it is a member of a countable Π 0 1 set. Equivalently, a real is ranked if it is a path through a recursive tree with no perfect subtrees. The reader is referred to Cenzer et al. [1] for details on the topic, including a proof that for all recursive ordinals α there is a ranked set of degree 0 (α) . Here we demonstrate these reals are not 1-generic relative to any perfect tree.
Lemma 5.1. If X is 1-generic relative to some perfect tree, then X is not ranked.
Proof. Suppose not. Let X be 1-generic relative to the perfect tree T and a path through the recursive tree U with no perfect subtrees. Let S = {σ ∈ T | σ / ∈ U }. Then S is recursive in T and X / ∈ S, so there exists an n such that no τ ∈ T extending X|n is in S. Hence for every τ ∈ T such that τ ⊇ X|n we have τ ∈ U . But then U has a perfect subtree, for a contradiction.
In fact, the above proof shows reals recursively generic relative to some perfect tree are not ranked. It follows from Cenzer et al. [1] and this lemma that there are reals arbitrarily high in the hyperarithmetic degrees which are not 1-generic relative to any perfect tree. We note the proof of Lemma 2.2 can be relativized to an initial perfect tree. Using this we observe that no Turing degree can contain both a ranked set and a real 2-generic relative to some perfect tree (and no truth table degree a ranked set and a real 1-generic relative to some perfect tree). Hence no ∆ 0 2 set is 2-generic relative to some perfect tree, and the degrees 0 (α) for any recursive α contain no reals 2-generic relative to some perfect tree.
We can also attempt to classify which reals are 1-generic relative to some perfect tree by use of the r.e. (Ershov) and REA hierarchies. The reader is referred to Jockusch and Shore [4] for details on these hierarchies. We begin by observing that no real whose degree is at a finite level of the REA hierarchy (hence also the r.e. hierarchy) is 1-generic relative to some perfect tree. [10] ). Let n ∈ ω, X a real of n-REA degree. Then X is not 1-generic relative to any perfect tree.
Lemma 5.2 (Slaman
Proof. Fix n and X and let W be an n-REA set with X ≡ T W . Let W 1 , W 2 , . . . W n = W witness that W is n-REA; for all i ≤ n we have W i ≤ T W i+1 and W i+1 is r.e.(W i ). Suppose X is 1-generic relative to T . We show by induction that for all m ≤ n we have W m ≤ T T using the following claim:
We note X / ∈ S and S is r.e.(T ) since Y is r.e.(T ). Hence for some l, every q extending X|l is not in S. We can now describe Y by noting that n ∈ Y iff ∃q ⊇ X|l[{e} q (n) ↓= 0]. Hence Y is r.e.(T ) as desired.
For the induction, given W m ≤ T T we note that W m+1 is r.e.(W m ), hence r.e.(T ), and apply the claim to W m+1 . As a result W ≤ T T so X ≤ T T for a contradiction.
We might next hope to show sets of ω-REA degree are not 1-generic relative to any perfect tree. However, we cannot even do this for sets which are ω-r.e. In proving the Friedberg Inversion Theorem for the truth table degrees, J. Mohrherr [7] showed by a reduction that there is a 1-generic G such that G ≤ tt 0 ′ , hence G is ω-r.e. Here we provide a direct construction. We use the definition that X is ω-r.e. if for some partial recursive ψ : ω × ω → 2 we have X(n) = ψ(b, n) where b is least such that ψ(b, n) ↓.
Lemma 5.3. There is a 1-generic real which is ω-r.e.
Proof. In this construction we extend to meet the first r.e. set we find while still looking for earlier r.e. sets skipped over. If we find a set that has been skipped, we start over again from that point. We start with a preliminary construction where we don't restart in order to find a recursive bound, f , on the number of changes we may need to make. We recursively construct f : ω → ω and σ ∈ 2 ω in stages. Let f (0) = 0 and σ 0 = . At stage n + 1 we search simultaneously for e > f (length(σ n )), τ ⊇ σ n , and s to find {e} τ s ↓. We then let σ n+1 = τ and extend f by setting f (k) = e for all k such that length(σ n ) < k ≤length(σ n+1 ).
For the main construction, we build in stages our generic X ∈ 2 ω and the partial recursive witness, ψ, that X is ω-r.e. We also use some numeric variables for bookkeeping. r denotes the r.e. set we are looking at, k i for i ∈ ω the number of corrections at the i-th r.e. set, and m i for i ∈ ω the length of the initial segment of X currently meeting the i-th r.e. set (0 if not yet met). We start with ψ = ∅, X = , r = 0, and k i , m i = 0 for all i.
At stage n + 1 we search simultaneously for i such that m i = 0, τ ⊇ X n | max j<i (m j ), and s to find {i} τ s ↓. If i > r we have found a new r.e. set and add it by letting m i =length(τ ), X n+1 = τ , r = i, and for l such that length(X n ) < l ≤length(X n+1 ) we let ψ(f (l) − k l , l) = X n+1 (l). If instead i < r we have found a r.e. set we have skipped over and restart at that point. We do this by first setting m i =length(τ ) and for l such that max j<i (m j ) < l ≤ m r setting k l to k l + 1. We next reset X n+1 to τ (it will not extend X n , but will extend X n | max j<i (m j )). Finally, for l such that max j<i (m j ) < l ≤ m i we extend ψ by letting ψ(f (l) − k l , l) = X n+1 (l) and then for j with i < j ≤ r we set m j = 0.
We note that the values of X used to meet the nth r.e. set are changed at most n times, once for every earlier r.e. set that was skipped over and discovered later. The function f bounds the number of corrections needed, and ψ(b, n) witnesses X is ω-r.e. by starting with b = f (n) and moving b down one every time a correction is made.
We note that by the REA Completeness Theorem (Jockusch and Shore [4] ) this gives that for every X ≥ T ∅ (ω) there are sets A and J such that X ≡ T A⊕J where J is 1-generic (A).
There is still considerable room left to explore in determining which reals are 1-generic relative to some perfect tree. In particular, it is not yet known if every real not 1-generic relative to any perfect tree is hyperarithmetic.
